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In a recently published paper, CU Boulder political science Professor Jaroslav Tir highlights how intergovernmental organizations help end civil wars

There’s trouble in Africa, where a protracted civil war between government forces and rebels in the countryside threatens to undo years of hard work to raise the country’s standard of living and its prospects for future economic growth.

This is a job for the IMF.

No, not the��—the fictional U.S. covert government agency tasked with successfully completing next-to-impossible missions, as popularized by the Mission: Impossible film franchise helmed by Tom Cruise.

CU Boulder researcher Jaroslav Tir, a professor of political science, studies armed conflicts and how to stop them.

The other IMF—the��. Yes, really, that IMF.

The role the IMF, the World Bank and other intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have played in recent years to help broker peace agreements is highlighted in the research paper��” published earlier this year in the Journal of Peace Research, which was��coauthored by��Jaroslav Tir, ����������Department of Political Science professor, and Johannes Karreth, a CU Boulder PhD political science major and former Tir graduate student.

Tir, whose research focus includes armed conflicts and how to stop them, recently spoke with Colorado Arts and Sciences Magazine about how IGOs can help resolve conflicts by offering or denying financial incentives to governments and rebels. His responses have been lightly edited for style and condensed.

Question: How did these international government organizations get��into the conflict-resolution business?

Tir: That’s a very good question, right? Because the IMF, the World Bank and��various regional development banks don’t have mandates to end civil wars.

One thing we do know from the study of international organizations is that they tend to broaden their mandates. They are bureaucracies—and bureaucracies like to grow, generally. They like more resources. They like to do things well, because if they look good, they get some more resources. So, the fact they are going beyond the original mandates is not that surprising.

The more narrow answer is that a lot of these organizations are financial, so they deal with things like development assistance. They’re trying to get these countries more economically developed, and they’re trying to get their economies functioning better to raise the standard of living for the local populations and things like that.

The bad news for all of these economic agendas are civil wars. So, for example, if the World Bank/IMF invests tens of millions of dollars or sometimes even hundreds of millions of dollars in a country, and that country then ends up in a civil war, a lot of this progress and money that’s been invested is put in jeopardy. Therefore, these organizations have a literally vested self-interest to��try to��see if they can do something about these civil wars in member countries, because they’re��interested in��protecting their investments.

Question: How does a bank enforce a peace treaty?

Tir: To clarify, these organizations do not do this (enforce treaties), and in the paper we do not claim that they directly partake in the peace process. This is not them sending in peacekeepers. Instead, this is all done through financial incentives—or denial of incentives. So, it’s carrot and stick, but it’s all financial.

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General Soumaila Bakayoko, chief of Staff of the Ivorian Armed Forces, reviews the Ivorian troops during the First Ivorian Civil War in 2007. During the conflict, rebels particularly wanted access to voting rolls, notes CU Boulder researcher Jaroslav Tir. (Photo: Wikimedia Commons)

To answer your question more directly, how can they, quote unquote, enforce a peace process? For example, with these conflicting parties, the rebels and the governments, working toward peace, (IGOs) will essentially commit to put X amount of money into the country to deal with issues that are usually connected to economic development, but also maybe of interest to both the rebels and the governments. So, that’s the carrot.

And it’s a bit of a double-edged sword, because the idea is IGOs will give you these resources if you honor the commitments toward making peace. However, these resources will be denied or suspended if you fail to do so. Meaning, if you’re a bad actor or you’re backpedaling or acting in malfeasant ways, there are (financial) consequences.

Question: It seems like the IGO might have an easier time incentivizing a government than a rebel group?

Tir: I think they incentivize both, but I think it is easier for them to incentivize the government because the government is a member of the organization. It’s the government of Country X, for example, that actually has a seat at the IMF/World Bank. So, the contact there is pretty direct.

For the rebels, there is not necessarily direct contact with the IGO because they never have a seat at the organization. But rebellions take place typically because rebels need or want something, and whether these things are financial or not, usually money can help them achieve this.

For instance, in the Ivory Coast during its civil war in the early 2000s, one thing that the rebels really wanted was access to voting rolls, to assure that all citizens could vote in the elections. In a way that’s a political issue, but in other ways it’s a very logistical kind of issue. And money needs to be spent to basically go through the records and see who is eligible to vote, and these administrators who are going to do this need to be paid.

Then the other thing the rebels were really interested in was that they did not have very good health care access—for example, childhood vaccines and standard stuff that has been provided for decades around the world, but the government didn’t offer it in the rebel-held areas. The rebels said, ‘This is something that’s very important to us because our children are dying, and our people are getting sick. So, they said, ‘We want access to vaccinations and access to health care.’

The World Bank and the IMF essentially said, ‘If these are kinds of things that are meaningful to you, these things are good for the World Bank/IMF as well.’ And that makes sense, because if people are healthier, they’re more economically productive, right? So, there is your economic incentive, and once this leads to stability, stability is good for economic growth and development.

This is a way in which international organizations can incentivize rebels to come to the negotiating table. That’s the carrot for them.

Question: From reading the paper, it sounds like not all IGOs are created equal.

Tir: Definitely, they are not all created equal. But we’re not just looking at the issue of size of the IGO or how many countries belong to the IGO. We’re basically looking at a different kind of variance that occurs among international organizations, and that is how much leverage they have over member countries.

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"(Syria) is a country that’s been internationally isolated for decades under the Assad regime, and part of that isolation is not having memberships in these (IGOs)," notes CU Boulder researcher Jaroslav Tir. "So, when the civil war broke out, there was not a lot of incentive-type influence from the international community that could bring the (factions) in Syria to the negotiating table." (Photo: Mahmoud Sulaiman/Unsplash)

Some organizations have very little leverage over member countries—meaning that the member countries tell the organization what to do and not the other way around. So, it’s a question of who is the boss. Is it the member country, or is it the organization that’s the boss? That’s one source of variation.

The other source is how many resources (IGOs) have. And this is very important in the context of civil wars, because the resources can then be used as carrots to basically get the governments and the rebels to work toward peace.

You have to have both: the institutional leverage that the organization can tell member countries what to do, and that has to be coupled with these material resources. So, it’s not just these organizations telling countries and rebels what to do, it’s actually incentivizing them to work toward peace.

Question: Are there cases in which IGOs are less effective in incentivizing peace? What do those look like?

Tir:��One example would be Syria. This is a country that’s been internationally isolated for decades under the Assad regime, and part of that isolation is not having memberships in these (IGOs). So, when the civil war broke out, there was not a lot of incentive-type influence from the international community that could bring the (factions) in Syria to the negotiating table. …

Another example would be Uganda, which had a civil war and there’s been no peace agreement. And the reason there has been no peace agreement is the rebel group. The�� was simply not interested in making any kinds of concessions. It seems like they’re more interested in having a rebellion than advancing any kind of policy or political objectives.

That was a case where international organizations were involved, where they observed the Ugandan government was willing to do its part, but the Lord’s Resistance Army was not serious about negotiating. So, what ended up happening there is��that��international organizations are just working with the Ugandan government and the LRA is cut out of the whole process.

Question: Your paper talks about IGOs in relation to comprehensive peace agreements. What, specifically, is a comprehensive peace agreement and how is it different from other types of peace agreements?

Tir: It is exactly what it sounds like: It’s a peace agreement that’s comprehensive—that tackles a multitude of issues, whereas partial peace agreements only resolve a subset of the contentious issues.

Civil wars are very complex, with disagreements over a variety of different issues, such as police reform, access to government power, representation, access to health care and who gets to serve in the military. In some countries, military service is ethnically based, depending upon if you are a member of a certain ethnic group.

The two big benefits of these comprehensive peace agreements are: first, because they do tackle a multitude of issues, they’re much more likely to resolve a civil war; and second, they help ensure that the resolutions the rebels and the government make actually stick, which is important, because civil wars are notorious for recidivism. Once a country has a civil war, there’s a much higher likelihood of having a civil war recurrence down the road.

As we highlighted in the article, fewer than one in five conflicts are resolved by comprehensive peace agreements. So, they’re great, but they’re rare.

Question: It sounds like CPAs, or any peace agreements, require an extended commitment of time and resources by the IGOs if they are going to be successful.

Tir:��(IGOs) have to write substantial checks … and these resources need to be provided over time. They are committing themselves to be involved in a country for many years. So, it’s not just offering a carrot (financial incentive) today but also in the future. The technical term for it is shadow of the future.

Basically, the idea is: We (the government and rebels, separately) want these future resources and because we want them, that essentially makes us think twice about reneging on the peace agreement. And if we (as a party to the peace process) are in a situation where we believe the other side has an incentive to abide by the agreement, we’re likely to uphold our end as well.

It’s kind of a puzzle, a Rubik’s Cube, how the pieces of the peace process come together, and if they do, we find the chances of these agreements being reached and maintained are substantially higher.

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